CRP reported 3rd quarter earnings (quarter ended 12/31/11) on February 9, 2012. Although I don’t want this blog to get bogged down with continual updates on CRP, I did want to give a brief update on what’s happening and my current investment thesis on the company.
3rd quarter numbers were, as expected, ugly. The low capacity utilization management had prepped us for last quarter translated into top line sales of only $22.6 million – the lowest in the six quarters CRP has owned Riverland Ag. Although there were underlying positives, such as “trading” gains that helped boost the gross margin to 21.5% (including this quarter, gross margin has averaged 14.3% in the six quarters since CRP purchased Riverland Ag), the bottom line remained negative with a loss of $0.11 per share.
More important to our investment thesis – the Net Current Asset Value (NCAV) of CRP dropped from $5.69 per share last quarter to $5.29 on 12/31/11. The biggest influences on this drop were an $8.4 million decline in “Due from brokers” (perhaps a result of the trading gains noted above?), a $5.0 million drop in Portfolio Investments (partially attributable to a $3.3 million mark-down due to “Change in fair value of investments”), and a $1.4 million drop in Accounts Receivable. An increase in cash and a decline in total liabilities (paydowns of debt and payables) were insufficient to offset these current asset declines.
Since my last CRP update, when the stock was trading at $5.00 (right before it dropped as low as $4.20), the stock has rallied back above NCAV to $5.90/share:
In effect, CRP is no longer offering “free money.” We now have to assume at least some value in the Property Plant and Equipment to justify the current share price. Specifically, we need to assume $0.61/share in long-term asset value to justify the current price ($5.90 – $5.29). With 55 million bushels of storage capacity and 14.691 million shares outstanding, this equates to $0.16 per bushel of storage capacity. Last fall, CRP management communicated to me that they feel elevator storage capacity is worth ~$1.10/bushel and they cited purchases by Bunge and Gavilon to justify this level. Are the elevators of Riverland worth $1.10/bu? I honestly don’t know.
I am more familiar with the country elevator system (Riverland has a mix, but the company’s focus seems to be on end-market and transport terminals). In the country elevator system, we are in the midst of an “upgrade” cycle. Older terminals are being refurbished, repurposed, or even abandoned as elevator companies move toward the economic advantages of shuttle loaders (elevator’s capable of loading 100-110 railcars within 15 to 18 hours). Of the 9 Riverland Ag facilitates listed on the BNSF.com website, only one – the 10.85 million bushel WB Duluth Storage facility – is shuttle capable. Will the same upgrade cycle hurt end-market and transport facilities? Or, is this phenomenon specific to country elevators, where it is easier to relocate a facility and you are more captive to rail shipments? I honestly don’t know.
What I do know is that today, even with the recent recovery in price (back above the NCAV), the gap between CRP’s share price and book value remains wide at nearly 50%:
At this level of discount, to earn a 10% return on our investment we need CRP to generate an ROE of just 5.4% (0.54 P/B x 10%). This equates to annual EPS of $0.58 ($10.83 book value x 5.4% ROE). Put in terms of profit per bushel of storage capacity, Riverland would need to earn $0.155 per bushel of capacity. Is this doable? Yes. Will CRP be able to accomplish the feat? Time will tell.
For now, I remain invested and am willing to give management the benefit of the doubt. Management owns in aggregate ~22% of the outstanding shares, which should give them plenty of incentive to be good stewards of our (their) capital.
With the stock trading at just 54% of book value (albeit a likely inflated book value), revenue and capacity utilization coming off very low levels, an inverted Minneapolis wheat futures, and even a small equity option through the Stewart Southern Railway, I’m willing to hold CRP for the interim.
For a good write-up on when to sell a net-net, see Geoff Gannon’s recent article “How Long Should You Hold a Net-Net?”
Full Disclosure: Long CRP
Harvest Investor © 2012. All rights reserved. The content and ideas contained in this blog represents only the opinions of the author. The content in no way constitutes investment advices, and should never be relied on in making an investment decision, ever. No content shall be construed as a recommendation to buy or sell any security or financial instrument, or to participate in any particular trading or investment strategy. The author may hold positions in the securities and companies mentioned on this site. Any position disclosed on this site may be modified or reversed without notice to you. The content herein is intended solely for the entertainment of the reader, and the author.
6 comments:
Thanks for continuing to follow this company. Great post.
A bit of a bump up with the Viterra deal. Anyone have any comments? Does this deal make CRP a takeover opportunity? Is it relevent?
Is it coincident that the Viterra speculation heats up right as the bids for Gavilon Group are due? Is Viterra just a pawn to try and "soften" the price of Gavilon? Or, is Viterra the better opportunity / value?
With CRP's size, it could always be a bolt-on acquisition, but management has never indicated an interest in this that I've heard. All of this acquisition chatter may actually be a problem as CRP tries to deploy cash into what may now be more expensive assets.
When can we expect your next post?
Sorry about not posting recently - I plan to have a new post up in the next couple of weeks as my schedule permits. Been researching a few new companies and will likely post info on one of these.
Hi Spike,
I imagine you are tired of reporting this stock, but you are the only analyst (pro or otherwise) covering it.
If you have time to calculate NCAV versus NAV versus share price or whatever you want for the latest (Q4) numbers released today I would be interested.
It seems their earnings loss was small but they burned through a lot of cash (I think CAPEX for Riverland ate most of it but that's just a guess.)
Cash and Portfolio has dropped in one year from about $64M to $39M with not a lot to show for it that I can see. Contrast this to your George Risk analysis where they seem to guard the war chest vigorously.
Whatever you have time or interest to say (even a comment here) would be great.
Thank you.
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